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IV.—THE FIELD OF ESTHETICS PSYCHO-
LOGICALLY CONSEDEKED. L
By H. R. MARSHALL.
§ 1. ^Esthetics may be looked upon as a special brunch of
the broader Science of Hedonics, and must be so viewed, it
appears to me, if we are to make satisfactory progress inxthe
psychological treatment of its problems.
If this be true, the Pleasure-Pain theory which I havfi
advanced (see MIND, 56, 63, and 64) should find corrobora-
tion in the phenomena which we call ^Esthetic, and the
theory in its turn should aid us in grasping iEsthetic
principles.
It is probable that some of my readers will be unable to
accept as self-evident my position that the essential
characteristic in Esthetics is to be found in the hedonic
effect produced by the work of Art,1 and therefore before I
can make use of the corroborative evidence or attempt to
indicate the Esthetic principles to which the theory seems
to lead it is necessary to ask these readers to review the steps
which lead me to take this view.
It must be stated here that I shall, in what follows, use
the words Art and ^Esthetics in a very wide sense.
Any device of man which serves to produce in any one an
^Esthetic thrill I shall not hesitate to call a work of Art.
When a man is experiencing or has experienced an ^Esthetic
feeling must be judged by his statement which cannot be
questioned or by some less distinct expression. We must
allow that that object has wrought an ^Esthetic effect which
has produced on general lines the same individual or racial
expression that we accept as evidence of ^Esthetic enjoyment
in ourselves and our own friends with whom we sympathise
fully. I think this wide use of terms will be justified in
what follows.
Comparatively few people in our day, even among those
who claim wide cultivation, realise how much of human
1
 This consideration of the effect upon the observer ia too often ob-
Bcared by failure to separate it from the problem concerning the impulse
which leudx to Art production, which is on its face an entirely different
matter.
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thought has been given in the past to the philosophic con-
sideration of Esthetics, although the special student of Art
theory soon becomes impressed with this fact; for turn
whither he will, he finds his way blocked by the ruins of
systems which obstruct and obscure his path. That we
have reached very little satisfactory result is indeed true,
and this fact, no doubt, explains the existing inappreciation
of the importance of iEsthetic Philosophy itself and accounts
for the small general interest which is taken in the work of
thepast in this direction.
However tedious the labour be, the student of to-day who
hopes to advance must necessarily endeavour to gain a com-
prehensive view of what has been done in the past. Our
relatively modern methods of written record have given to
the thought of the past few centuries a retentiveness which
makes it for us* a didactic entity, and the historical method
therefore has in these days become of primary importance.
The student of iEsthetic theory finds his work long and
laborious, and after it all, must admit, I think, on the whole,
that ^Esthetic Psychology has gained little of fundamental
importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past.
This is by no means because iEsthetic problems have been
left unconsidered by the best thinkers; rather because they
.have looked upon them for the most part as secondary
issues; issues of moment, truly, but subordinate to
systemisation which from other points of view had become
of predominant importance.
It is because of this subordination that we find on every
side presentations of eminently partial views. In some
cases these are held as valid, and made the basis of unsatis-
factory dogmatism. In other cases we find the discussion
carried forward on lines so narrow that the student becomes
doubtful how far the writer has intended to claim his prin-
ciples as fundamental. Note, for instance, the Cartesian
treatment of beauty which limits its range to elements of
sight pleasure; and the notion of Aristotle as to the relation
of Imitation to Art, to which we refer below : views of
masters these are indeed; but views which we are unable to
take seriously, now-a-days.
It happens thus that our study brings the masters of
thought before us in most cases as ."prophets," in the old
Scriptural sense, rather than as scientific teachers. They
furnish us with inspiration for our work and with data of
value drawn from their own experience; of more value indeed,
for the most part, than the theories which they propound.
On the other hand, we find in many cases men of less im-
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360 H. B. MAB8HAL1I :
portance in the world of thought touching special problems
of psychologic aesthetics in more satisfactory manner than
the well-recognised master.1
It seems to me clear that Non-hedonistic iEsthetic
theories have, from a psychological point of view, re-
sulted in failure.
In the section which follows this I attempt to show the
lines on which these non-hedonistic theories have developed
and the directions in which they fail.
This section may be passed over without break in the
argument by any reader who will allow the points contained
iij the paragraphs with which the third section opens.
§ 2. The earliest definite thought centres around objectB
which attract attention : nor is this objective reference ex-
clusively a characteristic of crude thinking; it is natural for
any one whose point of view is cosmological rather than
psychological. We should expect, therefore, to find early
writers, and in later times men for whom the world of ob-
jects is specially important, examining the beautiful object
itself for some quality or qualities which must be present if
it is to appear beautiful; qualities which will account for the
effect produced by its contemplation.
Aristotle's ^Esthetic theory had evidently a strong objec-
tive bent. Although he held that one of the ends for which
the artist worked was the giving of pleasure, this pleasure
was to be given by the imitation of beautiful objects, and in
these he thought he had found certain distinctly objective
qualities upon which beauty depended; — such as Order,
Symmetry, a certain Magnitude.
Only fragments of his Art theory, however, seem to have
come down to us, and what we have is so evidently incom-
plete that it can only be referred to illustratively.
His principle of Imitation, for instance, casts out of
the ^Esthetic field most of music and practically all of
architecture, and his demand for Symmetry excludes much
which all the world now-a-days agrees to call aesthetic.
Tendencies to objectivism appear in the aesthetic work of
many later writers of the highest authority, e.g., Herbartand
1
 The ^Esthetic hedonist does not need to look fax for the psychologies
explanation of this fact, for it is well recognised that the psychosis of
thought is not strong in pleasure-pain elements ; men whose lives are
given to thought and who write of thought mast expect to lose in them-
selves all predominance of Pleasure and Pain in direct connexion with
the subject-matter of their writing ; and if pleasure be of the essence of
aesthetics it is but natural that esthetic problems should be given a
secondary place by such writers.
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his followers, and in that of men of less weight from the
psychologists' standpoint. . Edmund Burke, who has given
us a work on the Sublime which is valuable in many direc-
tions, shows this tendency. He gives us a set of objective
qualities as necessary to beauty, which are manifestly inade-
quate to cover the ground.1 The thought of Hogarth as an
active art worker in a certain line is worthy of consideration
as expressing a natural, although superficial, solution of
the ^Esthetic problem. His six elements of beauty,* very
different from Burke's, are equally incomprehensive.
This special method of procedure has not often been
Beriously carried out, however, and doubtless because the
difficulties which appear soon became overwhelming. The
indefinite variety of those objects which are looked upon as
beautiful makes hopeless the task of enumerating objective
qualities which shall cover all the ground.
Plato's ideas were emphatically objective, and, notwith-
standing assertions to the contrary, modern Idealism itself
has never been able to shake off this objectiveness so far as
aesthetics is concerned. In presenting to us Ideals, Uni-
versals, Absolutes, as fixed aesthetic standards, it has in this
very fact taken an objective attitude. * The value of modern
Idealism in its bearing upon philosophic questions being
granted, we must admit, I think, that psychologic aesthetics .
gains very little from it. So far as its tenets are not covered
in what we shall discuss m what follows it gives us little in
this direction which is not psychologic mysticism. It has
had much to say concerning aesthetics, but largely to force
it into line with some preconceived metaphysical system or
to make it fill some gap which otherwise would leave the
thought sequence incomplete.* The relation of the Universal
to the Particular; of the Idea to its objective Tealisation;
of the Absolute to the Finite, have been made to account
for aesthetic effects in many different- ways, but without
leaving us any help in deciding why objects are beautiful or
which of divergent standards must be accepted. This last
question presents the great stumbling-block to the accept-
1
 Smallness of size — Smoothness — Gradual variation of outline—
Delicacy—Brightness—Parity and softness of colour.
1
 Fitness to some design—Variety—Uniformity—Regularity or Sym-
metry—Simplicity—Intricacy—Quantity.
* Even those who torn away from an objective search would be likely
to say that the esthetic psychosis implied an objective content, but not
even here are thinkers agreed; Schleiermacher seems to hold the produc-
tive faculty alone to be essential in ./Esthetics.
4
 Kant's treatment under Quantity, Quality, Relativity, Modality.
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ance of any form of Universal Idealism or Absolutism, so far
as ^Esthetic standard is concerned; for if there be an absolute
Ideal Beauty, a Universal Beauty, why should any one
differ radically from me as to whether an object before us is
aesthetic or not ? Or again, why should my own change of
mental attitude make me think that beautiful now, which
some years ago I thought worthless ? Perhaps my reader
will say, with Lotze, that development of capacity for the
apprehension of this Ideal is necessary; that if he thinks the
object before us is beautiful and I do not, it shows that my
capacity to grasp the Ideal is more limited than his own.
But suppose Defore us an object which you call aesthetic, and
which is not merely negatively indifferent to me, but posi-
tively ugly—disagreeable to me; although I may perhaps be
able to look back to a time when it was aesthetic for me also.
I t is not that I find it unaesthetic, but utterly the reverse of
aesthetic; that is, it is quite opposed to my standard, while it
is in accord with yours ; the standards, therefore, cannot differ
by mere limitation, but are radically contradictory. Bergman1
suggests the ingenious hypothesis that the difference lies in
actual difference of object grasped ; that you and I think we
grasp the same thing, but really do not. That the Ideals
do not differ, but that we are incorrectly comparing different
Ideals. If this position be accepted, we must, so far as I can
Bee, acknowledge all taste as equally authoritative in
the positing of a standard, and this takes away the very
basis of the Idealistic position here discussed. Perhaps
it might be maintained that, notwithstanding this diversity
of the appreciation of beauty, the criterion of Universality
is valid, oy claiming that that is called beautiful which we
think of as Universal, however far that Universality may be
from being a fact. Such argument, however, will not hold,
for in most cases we are aware fully of the existence of
diverse views as to the object which is beautiful for us, and
notwithstanding this, our feeling is distinct and clear and is
not in its essence changed by any consideration of the fact
that others differ from us in their judgment.
Mr. Begg,f who approaches the subject from an intui-
tionist's standpoint, takes a distinct objective position, and
acutely suggests that diversity of standard does not argue
against the objectiveness of beauty but in favour of its .uni-
versal distribution. Different people differ in their capacity
1
 Bergman, Ueber dot Sth&nt, pp. 168 ft
' W. Prondfoot Begg, Thi Dtvtlopmmt of TatU and other Studiu t»
/Esthetia, chap, viii
 at U
niversity of Iow
a Libraries/Serials A
cquisitions on June 5, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
FIELD OF AESTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. 3 6 3
to perceive the beauty in some special object, bat it is there
for all that, if one single person sees it. He who considers
the object ugly is so constituted that be is affected by other
qualities in the object than its beauty, and these latter draw
his thought away to special ugliness.
Such a position, however, if I understand it, can be main-
tained only by one who has not yet seen the force of the
modern criticism of " faculty psychology ". The argument
in favour of beauty as a manifestation of an objective uni-
versality is weakened by the lack of any clear separation of
the character of universality from the non-esthetic. I,
for my part, cannot agree that the merely agreeable is
not often recognised as non-individual. What others
call pleasure, people as a rule are very ready to class
as agreeable, while they are not at all ready to allow an
objective impression to be beautiful unless they delight
in it themselves. On the other hand, I cannot feel that
the aesthetic thrill is any less egoistic than the most purely
individual sense gratification. Truly the work of art is
realised as giving pleasure to others as well as ourselves,
and this knowledge of sympathy adds keenly to our enjoy-
ment, but mere universality does not raise a pleasure into
the aesthetic field, for were this so, many of those pleasures
which we call the very lowest would be of the very highest
aesthetic value, and much that we hold to be best would be
cut out of the field by the smallness of the number who re-
joice with us. It is patent to all that the world of the artist
who is in advance is small, and yet we cannot on any accep-
tation of terms say that his work is on that account un-
aesthetic. If we gain little else from the study of these
systems, one fact is brought to our notice which is of con-
Biderable psychologic importance, and to which we shall
return, namely, that these thinkers find their aesthetic field
not only wide but relatively permanent; were it not BO,
introspection would so clearly deny the conceptions of
Universality and Absolutism that they could not be defended.
Let us now turn to the subjective view of the JEsthetic
Field.
Could we go back to the days of the " Faculty Psycho-
logists " our task were simple, for then we, with Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson, might satisfy ourselves by the assumption
of a special internal sense for the perception of beauty;
modern psychology, however, compels us to discard this and
all kindred views.
Earlier thought of an introspective character, whatever
be its direction, tends to lay especial stress upon (a) Sen-
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sualism. We see this to-day in the careful work of our
painstaking psycho-physicists and in the thought of those
whom they influence : in fact, we all find it difficult to avoid
over-emphasis of the importance of sense-organ products.
The study of the beautiful from its introspective side has
not infrequently shown this same over-emphasis.1 The
very term ^Esthetics in its derivation has a sense connota-
tion : Baumgarten first used it because he looked upon the
beautiful as the perfection of Sensuous knowledge, and
Kant's " Transcendental dlsthctic" treats of the a priori
principles of Sense. Perhaps the most thorough-going
statement of the Sensualistic position is given in our own
time by Mr. Grant Allen in his Physiological ^Esthetics, but
he himself has apparently lost faith in his own work2 in
this special direction, and it need not therefore be considered
at length. Although the sense-impressions give the normal
initiative in a vast majority of our aesthetic psychoses, it is
impossible in the field of sense to obtain any satisfactory
solution of aesthetic problems: and men will not accept a
view so narrow; they recognise at once that the effect pro-
duced upon them by a beautiful object is wider and fuller
than sense-impression^
(6) If the use of terms forms a basis for classification, a
good deal of the theory of the past may be classed as Emo-
tional, and this is true, especially among English thinkers,
of whom we may mention Alison and Jas. Mill. But
" Emotion " is a word of very indefinite meaning when it is
made to describe the fflsthetic field. It is either employed-
with little departure from the usage of the question-waiving
" faculty psychologists," or else it represents little more
than complexity of Pleasure or Pain. Emotionalism under
the first signification merely restates the questions of
^Esthetics, and under the second" throws us back upon
hedonism, which we shall presently consider.
(c) The most emphatic drift of thought in the direction
of the Content is, and has been, towards InteUectiuUism, and
naturally so. When critical examination fails to show any
special lntellectualproduct which, in width and in nature,
corresponds with ^Esthetic effect, there is a natural diversion
of attention to the examination of the Intellectual processes
1
 Burke is quoted by Yon Hutmonn as a representative sensualist, but
I think it more proper to class him as an Emotionalist. He defines
Beauty as a " quality by which an object causes love or some passion
qimilftr to it".
•See MIND, NO. 45.
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themselves, which leads in its extreme development to (d)
bald nationalism.
" Harmony " of mental action (and cruder notions as to
objective harmony are seldom altogether eliminated) and
the process of " Unification of the Manifold " are now and
again brought forward as all sufficient to account for
Esthetic result: but it is easy to show that we live in an
atmosphere of harmonies and are constantly dealing with
unities in manifoldness which not only have no marked
aesthetic • character, but ordinarily are devoid of all aesthetic
character whatever, and the same argument holds against
other similar principles.
Eationalism even in its crudest form takes a strong hold
upon men's minds, and maintains its ground, especially
among German thinkers, although often too covertly held
and vaguely stated. It is easy to see, however, that no
amount of argument, however conclusive its form may be,
can change our notion of what is, or what is not, beautiful
unless it induce an actual change in the matter which is
presented to thought. No better position is gained by re-
ferring the process to sub-consciousness;—by arguing that
the effect is due to recognition of relations tco delicate to
rise above the " threshold," but grasped, for all that, in the
^Esthetic state of mind.
This is a cowardly means of covering defeat which one
with no little surprise finds willingly accepted by thinkers
of the highest rank to this day {e.g., Helmholtz and his
school), and with the best of authorities in the past to give
weight to such method: for it must be remembered that
Kant was only willing to give Music a .position among the
Arts of Beauty because of the fine mathematical relation
between harmonious tones which from other investigations
have been found to exist, and which he supposed to be sub-
consciously grasped in the ^Esthetic effects of Music.
The vaguer statements of simpler Intellectualism, which
one finds so frequently, merely go to emphasise the fact
that reflective thought is of the greatest importance in the
iEsthetic psychosis. The best work of later writers, as we
shall see in what follows, tends to give value not only to the
Sensual, and the Emotional, but alao to the Intellectual, as
all involved in the aesthetic state, as we know it, and this is
the position to which we would be led by our synthetic line
of thought, if no other evidence appeared.
I do not find that the contentions of the Formalist, ex-
cept so far as they are hedonistic, go far to help us psycho-
logically. Concrete formalism fails to give us any unassail-
2 4 *
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able criterion of the aesthetic, and abstract formalism gives
us nothing more valuable, from our point of view, than a
mere restatement of the fact that we must look elsewhere
than to sensualism, or to the matter of the content, for the
"essence of the aesthetic. But so far as Formalism is
hedonistic, it points, it seemB to me, in the right direction.
This hedonistic view will receive full discussion in what
follows.
§ 3. Although the discussions which have been above
reviewed are very unsatisfying, they serve to give emphasis
to the fact that the field of Esthetics is always hedonic; and
this is a fact of great psychological importance. Whatever
else may be said of the aesthetic mental state, its pleasurable-
ness cannot be questioned. It is not necessary therefore to
prove the hedonic connexion, and, on the other hand, I do
not see how it is possible for any one to pass it over lightly.
Thinkers of all grades and of all schools, from Aristotle down-
wards, acknowledge the necessary connexion with pleasure .
whatever position they take as to the value or importance of
this fact.
It is not difficult indeed to find authorities, from Epicurus
down, whose statements may be interpreted as decisive ex-
pressions of the view for which I argue: and some few,
Fechner, for example, who distinctly base ..Esthetics upon
Hedonics. The average man, however, does not think of
pleasurableness as a characteristic feature of the aesthetic
unless his attention is called to it, and there is a good deal
of popular disinclination to the treatment of pleasure as an
element of any special importance in the aesthetic psychosis.
Certain men of penetration also raise the most violent oppo-
sition to any such treatment.
The popular opposition is not difficult to understand, for
the ordinary man does not learn of himself to catch the close
relation between a thoughtful phase of psychic life (which in
fact is seldom pleasurable to him) and the pleasure quality
which may go with it; he habitually thinks of the two not
only as separate but as in opposition, and when led to con-
sider anything so complex as the identification of hedonic
phase and aesthetic phenomena, he is unable to catch any
relation between the laborious thought involved in the con-
sideration, and the revivals which come to him in connexion
with the word " pleasure". He is led astray, however,
principally by his inability to think clearly. When he thinks
of aesthetics he always busies himself with some content of
art, and thus it not infrequently happens that it is difficult
even to persuade him that pleasure is an ever-present result
obtained from the consideration of art forms.
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With the theoretic opposition it is not so easy to have
patience. Von Hartmann1 goes so far as to deny us the
right to consider the hedonic quality in aesthetics as more
than an accident unrelated to the essence of the Beautiful.
The psychologist, however, cannot allow himself to be de-
terred from research in this direction by any objections
determined by theoretical preconceptions, although the
strong opposition deserves consideration, aud explanation.
Hedonic the aesthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this
hedonic quality is of great moment is a question to be de-
termined.
The Associationists in Psychology have seemed in a way
to identify beauty with pleasurableness by claiming it to be
the result of the association with objects of agreeable and
interesting ideas. Their doctrine in this regard is difficult
to treat specifically because of their failure to differentiate
Pleasure from the Emotions and because of their treatment
of Pleasure as though it were re-presentable, in the same
sense that a Content is, rather than being a quality which
may attach to a presented Content without belonging to its
revival at all.
That associations which are pleasurable are important
elements in an aesthetic effect I agree, as will appear later.
If the doctrine be held to mean, however, that aesthetic effect
is determined altogether by pleasure revivals I cannot follow,
for we shall presently see how much presentative pleasures
have to do with the effects of beauty.
If, on the other hand, the doctrine be meant to signify an
1
 Confer. Alt. $eit Kant, p. 864. Yon Hartmann grounds his position
upon the unimportance of the objective real thing ; if this be unimportant,
then so also is the hedonic aspect, for, says he, we have as little right to
look for the essence of the esthetic in the effect (Gefuhle) as in the cause(the object). (^Stihdik, p. 40.) In passing one may note that there
seems here to be a hidden shifting of ground. The " cause " of which
he speaks is an objective thing, that which he calls " effect" is something
which psychologically has no objective significance, and which hence is
not an " effect" in the same sense in which the object is the " cause ":
the objective universality of sesthetio pleasure, which Kant upheld, not
concerning us in an analysis of the psychologic state under discussion.
But apart from this point, I for one cannot with Von Hartmann see any
theoretical objection to looking to the object for our criterion, a procedure
which he considers altogether reprehensible; to the object in fact we
have been looking in the past, and the trouble is not that the search in
this direction is illegitimate, but that all our looking has brought no
result. We find nothing in the object which is always there if the esthe-
tic quality is to present itself to the observer. We therefore turn our
attention away from this object to that much of the subjective state
which is not part of this object and there we do find something which is
always present where esthetic effect is produced, viz., pleasure.
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identity between hedonic phenomena and aesthetic phe-
nomena we are at once met Tt>y the objection that while all
^Esthetic states of mind appear to be pleasurable not all
pleasurable states are allowed to pass as aesthetic. The
problem which is thus brought forward is an important one
which we must consider somewhat at length. It may t^ e
stated in the form of the question : What are the bounds of
the aesthetic within the hedonic field ?
No skill in introspective analysis is required to grasp the,
fact that there is a separation between hedonic and aesthetic :
the careless thinker is the one most ready to take it for
granted, and high authorities also make much of it. Sully,
for instance, thinks Kant's elucidation of the separation of
the Beautiful from the Good and the Agreeable one of his
important achievements for ^Esthetics.1 But it' appears to
me that altogether too much is made of this separation.
Thinkers who are our teachers have over-emphasised the
separateness by drawing attention away from the connexion
between the two fields, and it is important, I think, to take
a position opposed to the usual one; to emphasise the lack
of separateness between Hedonics and ^Esthetics.
If one examine the work of art critics and the more or less
philosophic and scientific writings which deal with the/acts of
^Esthetics rather than its theory, one will find little more
than descriptions of pleasure-getting coupled with more or
less thorough attempts to arrange this pleasure-getting in a
logical way. If, on the other hand, one examine the writ-
ings of those who have expressly studied the psychology of
pleasure, one finds aesthetic phenomena treated altogether as
the best-recognised data of Hedonics; used to corroborate
theory and to justify classification, exactly as the simplest
sense-pleasures are used. Let us look at this from another
point of view. Take into consideration any average com-
plex aesthetic object; we find it a very wide one with certain
elements which are emphatically pleasurable. Eliminate in
thought the pleasurable elements one by one, and we find
that while in the main the object does not change the mass
of its Content, its aesthetic quality gradually disappears. We
may acknowledge still that it has a right to be named
aesthetic because of the opinions of others and because of our
own judgments in the past, but for ourselves at the time it
has lost all that makes it worthy of lieing called by so
honourable a name. We are all familiar with the fact that
1
 Article " ./Esthetics," Enc. Britannica. Cf. also lilencke, Die Trennung
d. Scliiincii r. Auyenelim, p. 8.
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\n object which but a moment ago was aesthetic for as may
become unaesthetic by a degradation to "indifference " or pain-
lulncss of the special content which was giving us pleasure.
Tni- suggestion of a ridiculous or painful association, with
ti>i;it' essential element in an art-complex, will for all time
it Jiu-e for us the aesthetic value of the whole work. The
average art critic indeed very often makes and unmakes
asthetic objects for the masses in this way.
Certainly these facts indicate a very close connexion
between the Hedonic and ..Esthetic fields, and one which
psychologically would seem to be essential Of course the
separation so commonly made must also be acknowledged,
and it is worth our while, I think, to consider the main re-
sults which have been reached by those who have attempted
to mark the lines of separation with distinctness.
This review, if tediouB, may be passed over, and, as before,
I place it in a special section for the reader's convenience.
§ 4. If the field of aesthetics be a portion of the hedonic
field, it certainly ought not to be a difficult task, one would
say, in some rough way to mark off that part of the hedonic
field which is aesthetic from that which is not: to differentiate
the one from the other by a process of limitation of the
pleasure field. This, however, does not appear at all an
easy matter when one comes to attempt it. The average
intelligent observer who has not given the matter especial
study will be likely to say, off-hand, that the sense-pleasures
at all events are excluded when we refer to the aesthetic.
In the exposition of theories from a non7hedonistic point of
view this position has been often taken either explicitly or
less directly by the limitation of the field to non-sensorial
states. Kant's separation of the Agreeable from the Beautiful
indeed turns largely upon his notion that the sense-pleasures,
which are essential to the former, are wanting in the latter.
That aesthetic pleasure is wider than sense is not open to
question, but it must be granted that we obtain well-marked
aesthetic results which cannot be separated from sensation,
such as we find, e.g., in the impression produced by a rich
colouring, and in the fulness of simple tones. We find in-
deed when we go to the root of the matter that it is only the
so-called " lower sense " pleasures which it is desired to ex-
clude. The inclusion of sense effects through eye and ear
does not create opposition. But it seems to me that if it be
admitted that one set of senses can produce aesthetic effect
the whole contention, fails; and a close examination shows
clearly, I think, that the rest of the senses may act in the
same manner in the make-up of esthetic complexes. This
24
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a large majority of tbe more capable thinkers find it necessary
to acknowledge, for they do not hesitate to take the pleasures
of the sense-impression into account. Nobody can complain
that Ldtze bad leanings towards sensualism. But he says
clearly in this connexion* that the first condition of a work
of art is its power to please the senses.* " If we step into
the shadow of the wood at height of noon," says Bergman,
" the agreeable refreshment is bound up with the idea of the
grandeur of the forest; the refreshing coolness belongs to
that which we feel to be the beauty of the wood ; " and this
comes from one who lays the basis of aesthetics in contem-
plative thought. For my own part, I feel that the pleasur-
able impression of any sense may become a rich component
part of an (esthetic delight.
If one follow Alison or James Mill and his school,8 he will
refer all aesthetic enjoyment to emotional association. So
far as this theory is separable from pure hedonism it is
doubtless based upon introspective examination, which for
certain people (and to this class I belong) shows powerful
elements of Emotion in many aesthetic complexes. For
me, Love, Fear, Sorrow, Joy, &c, appear to be part and
parcel of many an aesthetic effect. I think it clear therefore
that pleasures of the typical emotions are of great moment
in aosthetics, but at the same time it is equally true that
they do not stand alone as the basis of aesthetic effect.
" Association" by itself can of course give no account of
distinctively aesthetic effect. It is a principle of important
consideration in aesthetics as in all phases of mental life.
It shows us the movement by which we reach the beauti-
ful but certainly not the exclusive qualities which produce
the distinctive effect.
The historically related opponents of Mill, viz., Reid,
Hamilton, and Stewart, all upheld a view which asserts
the non-importance of Emotion in claiming overmuch for
Intellect; they, however, show more or less willingness to
1
 Outline* ofj&thetiet, § 23.
1
 The objection of the German Idealists to the consideration of sense-
pleasures as of aesthetic worth is based upon theory, but it cannot be
supposed that they would uphold views which contradict their experience,
and we must seek later to account for so strong an opposition. There
is serious objection to the limitation of the use of the word esthetic to
exclude all but the u ScheingefUhle " as Von Hartmann does, in the fact
that the word now covers very generally the whole ground of the Beau-
tiful, and objective evidence shows that people generally do not accept
such a limitation.
• J. 8. Mill thought that his father had an unconscious follower in John
Buskin. (See his edition of 3. Mill's Analysis, voL ii 258.)
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admit the worth of other factors. Other writers go much
farther (eg., Hemsterhuis, Diderot) in their restriction of
the aesthetic to the intellectual activities. Kant excludes
sense and depends upon reflexion. Both Emotional and
Intellectual theories are weakened by failure to accept the
sense-element as valuable, but apart from this, such opposed
theories, although upheld by thinkers of power, are mutually
destructive as arguments looking to the fixing of aesthetic
differentia, on account of this very opposition. It is incredi-
ble that emotional association can be all of aesthetic enjoy-
ment, when the experience of such men as Reid and Hamilton
and Stewart could lead them to hold it unimportant; or
that Intellectual activity can be all-important, when the
Associationists were able practically to ignore it.
It may be well perhaps to note some late examples of the
Intellectual Emphasis. Prof. G. T. Ladd, who does not by
any means ignore the sensuous basis, holds (Elements of
Physiological Psychology, p. 521) that" even most elementary
aesthetic feelings cannot be considered as on a par with the
sensuous feelings or as mere aggregates of such feelings.
The tone of feeling which characterises the sensations
furnishes a material for genuinely aesthetic feeling, but the
latter always implies also the working of certain intellectual
laws and a union of simple feelings of sensation under time-
form and space-form." But where shall we find the space-
form or time-form in the aesthetic effect produced by mere
rich colouring or by the luscious tones of the human voice
apartment from any movement ? If we follow Prof. Ladd
we are compelled to deny the aesthetic quality in such cases
altogether. We refer to this theory again below. Berg-
man's view as to contemplation has been noted. He
attempts to cover the ground of Sense and Emotion, by
bringing them into Intellectual categories. Sense-Beauty,
Form-Beauty, " Stimmung "-Beauty ; but contemplation is
the basis. But, on the other hand, we have no less preten-
tious a thinker than Von Hartmannx denying that distinctly
intellectual operations are even pleasurable, and stating that
for himself relations of two ideas seem absolutely indifferent
up to the line where the intensity of the Vorstellungen
becomes so strong that pain ensues. It is interesting to
note that this contention is not merely modem. It goes
back to Greek speculation; Chrysippus, it will be re-
membered, holds as an argument against Aristotle that pure
speculation is a kind of amusement.
1
 JEu u Kant, p. 289.
 at U
niversity of Iow
a Libraries/Serials A
cquisitions on June 5, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
372 H. B. MARSHALL :
Many other theories have been brought forward which
involve limitations, for the most part, far less narrow than
in those cases which have just been considered and more
often implied by over-emphasis in some special direction
than upheld by specific claims : some of these deserve ex-
amination.
Reid himself finds that action of Intellect is not alone in
giving aesthetic quality, but is bound up with the functioning
of our moral faculty in producing the effect reached : while
Hamilton, on the other hand, lays stress upon the occupa-
tion of the Imagination and Understanding in a full, free,
and consequently agreeable activity. Reid shows the step
(logical rather than historical) to the emphasis of the play of
" Spiritual " feeling which we find in Cousin and Levdque,
in Shaftesbury and in John Ruskin, although Ruskin's
aesthetic field may, perhaps, be better described as that of
religious ecstasy. Hamilton, on the other hand, shows the
step to the extreme emphasis of Imagination which we find
in Addison. We may note also in this connexion the
trend of thought of which Bergman's position already re-
ferred to is an emphatic instance, viz., that the aesthetic
basis is to be found in the pleasures of contemplation. But
no one who takes a wider view than that of personal intro-
spection can limit the field of aesthetics to moral or to
imaginative effects, and I doubt whether any one can thus
narrow his own field. He must see aesthetic effects which
are non-moral, he must see others which seem to be entirely
separable from the imagination ; the latter view overlooks
the importance of Sense and Emotional elements, which
are acknowledged now-a-days to be of great moment.1
We cannot go farther in this examination of the effort to
separate the Agreeable from the Beautiful without consider-
ing Kant's notable contention in this regard. We must not
overlook, at the start, the fact that the matter of Kant's
consideration was by no means identical with that before
us at this moment. We inquire whether in the field of
iEsthetic Impression any special Hedonic Element must be
cast out. Kant was concerned with the a priori character
of his theoretical pure judgment; and, strictly speaking,
therefore, did not deal with our problem. We may, how-
ever, with profit examine his argument to see whether the
1
 The attempt to separate Scheingefuhlt from reale Gefiihie (Von Hart-
Diann's JE»., pp. 46 ft), although arising from metaphysical theory,
probably is psychologically based upon the same personal bias which
led to Addison's extreme view, and which produces the reference to con-
templation.
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psychological positions involved throw any light upon our
closely allied inquiry. Kant's main contention was that
the judgment as to Beauty had universal validity, while
that concerning the Agreeable was Individualistic,1 and this
was a contention into which he was led upon theoretical
rather than empirical grounds. It involved for him, in the
first place, the position that sense-pleasures must be ex-
cluded from the Esthetic. For pleasure and pain spring
from (1) sense-impression, or (2) from the processes in-
volved in tha binding together of ideas : only the latter of
which can be general: therefore the field of sense-impression
must be individual. We, dealing with the region of ^Esthetic
Impression, have, I think, already seen convincing evidence
that sense-pleasures cannot rightly be excluded; and it seems
to me that even if it were conclusively shown that they were
strictly individual, i.e., incommunicable, this fact would
not prove them to be valueless as elements of aesthetic
impression. But to return to Kant's argument, his theory
in this regard led him further to hold that all Interest muBt
be lacking in the Beautiful. The Sublime he allowed to
have a moral interest—for moral interests are the only ones
which are Universal—but Beauty in bis view has no direct
relation to morality, and, as all other than moral interests
are individual, Beauty to remain Universal muet exclude
interest. This is evidently a position reached from a purely
theoretical basis, but apparently it must have had its cor-
roboration in his own psychologic experience. Sympathetic
pleasures play an important part in all art work, of higher
1
 Blencke (Trermung d. Sehonen v. Anmrnehm, p. 89) remarks that the evi-
dence of the psychologic soundness of Kant's position is seen in the fact
that we are content to be plteued ourselves, while, on the other hand, we
try to communicate our judgment as to beauty to others, and such a
result Kant's principles would require. But it seems to me that Blencke
here goes too far. In the case of pleasures involved in the action of our
own peculiar organs, we recognise the pleasures as onr own to be sure,
but are very ready to endeavour to bring about the same experience in
our companions, by urging them to taste or touch, or listen or act as
we are doing; and we, only feel content that they cannot experience
them when we know that they have made the tnaL It is merely an
extension of this sympathetic altruism which leads us to endeavour to
bring out for others by explanation or description the elements of a
work of art which give us foil pleasure ; elements which are not apparent
always upon the surface, and, perhaps, dependent upon the sounding of
some chord which may be struck directly or associative!}" by discussion
and description. Here, too, when we find discussion and description
failing to make the object beautiful for a companion, we come to see
that we experience something which he cannot grasp. There seems to
be no separation between the course of thought in the two cases.
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le. Moreover, there ib probably little doubt that for
int and a large number of men of his general mental type
the most valued pleasures were and are obtained in fields of
. disinterested effort; that for them purely, egoistic pleasure-
getting always carries with it an ethical reproof which leans
towards the side of pain, and that for such men disinteres-
tedness must therefore be an essential characteristic of the
subjective aesthetic field. But it seems to me qnite clear
that this is a matter of individual mental bias. The ordinary
man who is not naturally disinterested in his action does not,
I am convinced, find the presence of self-interested elements
a bar to aesthetic enjoyment. The pleasurable pride of
ownership surely forms an element in the aesthetic delight
of many an Art collector. Personal interest enters for all
of us into our judgment concerning the beauty of those
whom we love, and ownership has the same effect upon the
judgment of many men concerning the beauty of their pos-
sessions. To return again to Kant's position. The recog-
nition of usefulness implies self-interestedness, directly or
indirectly, and Kant therefore found it necessary to hold
that the taste judgment was based upon an unpurposive
purpose, an aimless usefulness1 (Zweckmassigkeit ohne
Zweck), that is, a usefulness of such nature that it is unre-
cognised as useful, and hence not followed because of the
interest involved. As an element in the aesthetic impression,
however, I do not think that even recognisable usefulness
can be overlooked. It is commonly supposed to be an
essential to architectural beauty, at all events, and the rela-
tion to other branches of the aesthetic is also commonly
supposed to be intimate. Kant stands opposed to so great
a thinker as Aristotle in this respect, and later observers,
such as Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, Kames and Hogarth,
and notably Fechner, make usefulness of great importance
aesthetically. Usefulness per se in my opinion is not of so
high importance as is the absence of non-usefulness, as is
indeed all avoidance of shocks, but it seems to me evident
that it is an aesthetic element for most of us, and when we
find it considered of moment by such an acute observer as
Fechner we are compelled to regard its exclusion as impos-
sible. Buskin never preached a more fallacious or mis-
chievous doctrine than when he emphasised the thought
(Lamp of Sacrifice) that the useless things in structure
make Architecture out of Building.
i Yon Hartmann, J£*. nit Kant, p. SIS, iaya even this comes down to
objective fitness.
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Schiller restates the Kantian notion by his emphasis of
the " Play Impulse " in reference to Esthetics; the modem
evolutionary school as represented by Mr. Spencer takes the
same position, Prof. Bain following closely. This leads Mr.
Spencer to the exclusion of " life-saving functions " from the
aesthetic; but what becomes of Mr. Spencer's system if any
functions (especially pleasurable ones) are thought of as non-
life-serving, directly or indirectly, I do not clearly see. Even
if some functions of the so-called " higher " kind are classi-
fied as non-life-serving, to exclude all which do so serve
would surely cut off a large part of our aesthetic field.
As modern psychology draws a clear distinction between
receptive and motor nerve, not unnaturally do we find a
corresponding psychical distinction looked for in all direc-
tions, and Grant Allen in his Physiological Msthetics has
attempted to identify the aesthetic with the passive, recep-
tive pleasures. Some such view is also found implied in the
theories of not a few metaphysicians, and Fechner1 takes a
strong position in this direction; Mr. Allen may therefore
nlftim the best of company. On the other hand, however,
others, Schleiermacher for example, take quite an opposite
position in claiming all for the productive side of mentality.
Guyau's clear criticism * has given the theory of Passivity so
powerful a blow that no more than, reference seems needful.
It is well enough to emphasise the general passive nature of
the pleasure involved in aesthetic appreciation as opposed to
the active pleasures obtained in the creation of an art work,
but this gives us no reason for the exclusion of all pleasures
of action from aesthetic compounds. Our psychic life is so
bound up with the active ' side that it is impossible to cut
off the active element in any psychosis. Our emotions, our
desires, all relate to action, and beyond that what is added
to the pleasures of an aesthetic psychosis by the elements of
sympathetic activity is far from small.
It is not uninteresting to note here a very late Idealistic
view which apparently makes activity all-important. Prof.
Ladd in his Introduction to Philosophy (p. 343) marks the
differentia of aesthetics thus: " Nothing that is apprehended
as incapable of change of motion in time or space, and so of
the successive realisation of different movements of physical
1
 Von. A jEdhetik, voL L 64.
* ProbUma it Vathitiqws amtemporaine.
* Horwici holds that the esthetic effect produced by the representa-
tion of power is doe to an aroused idea (Vorstellung) of agreeable mus-
cular action. (Pt^chologitdu Analytm, Th. ii. Heft 2, p. 166.)
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3 7 6 H. B. MATtflTTAT.T. ;
or psychical being, appears beautiful to the human mind. But
not all movement of physical or psychical being is beautiful:
the movement which is beautiful must have two charac-
teristics. It must have spontaneity, or a certain semblance
of freedom; and it must use this spontaneity, as it were, in
self-limitation of an idea." It is evident from the very de :
finition that spontaneity, pure and simple, does ndt approve
itself to Prof. Ladd as fundamental; nor can it be held, I
think, that we find the phenomena of beauty in all cases
where we have " spontaneous movement which uses its
spontaneity in self-limitation of an idea".
The distinction between higher and lower grades of plea-
sure, which is so commonly met with, is by some writers,
and by many talkers, made determinant of the difference
between the aesthetic and the non-8esthetic. (In Kames we
find a good example of this doctrine.) There is something
illusory, however, about the very notion of such a distinction,
for no criterion for the valuation of pleasure qud pleasure
appears beyond its mere intensity.1 Our gratifications are
normally taken in the lines of our natural development; in
higher mental regions as we rise, or sad to say, in lower
regions if we fall. The direction of growth or of deteriora-
tion determines the field of pleasure-getting, and while there
is the strongest ground for belief in a constant increase in
pleasure-getting capacity,paripassu with our mental growth,
still it cannot be shown that the delights reached by the
man of high moral culture bring a better quality of pleasure
to him than the gratifications of the barbarian bring to the
savage mind; nor can it be shown that the pleasure which
we get when we reach a higher moral position is any better
per 8e than that which we experienced Ibefore we reached.it.
The fact is that when we speak of the " higher pleasures"
we are merely restating our problem in new terms. Those
pleasures which are aesthetic are the ones we call "higher,"
but until we can give some definite meaning to the word
"higher" in this connexion we gain nothing. In most
cases those who discuss the matter from this standpoint are
really dealing with ethical data. It is the man who has
grown to be capable of appreciating newer ethical standards,
and who has lost his pleasure in the old, who makes a dis-
1
 As Bentham tells as: " Quantity of pleasure being equal, posh-pin
is as good as poetry ". Confer also Dr. James Ward in Enc Brit., ix. e i ,
Art. "Psychology, for a careful statement of the facts. Compare
Fechner (Vor. d. JEL, VOL L 28), who explains what is called " higher"
pleasure as characterised merely by being itself the source of new
delights.
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tinction between pleasures of higher and lower grade.
What he has cast off as unworthy no longer gives him
pleasure in contemplation and is, no longer felt as {esthetic.
This is not, however, because the Esthetic has an essential
ethical dependence, but because ^Esthetics is founded upon
Hedonics. The man has gained new fields of pleasure-
getting as his character has developed : what he casts out as
non-fflsthetic because it is a "lower pleasure" is a pleasure
merely in name, is in reality so bound up with painf ulness as
to be necessarily unaBsthetic. This by no means shows that
what was pleasurable in his undeveloped or uncultivated
state was not aesthetic for him at that time, or that the
pleasures of the savage are not aesthetic for him.
Not that ethical standards are unimportant in ^Esthetics.
Apart from the aesthetic delight, which we gain from what
Aristotle callB Moral Beauty, i.e., from the recognition of
nobility of aim and strength of purpose, the appreciation of
" aesthetic aspects of character," of " the beauty of holiness,"
the influence of our ethical standard upon our aesthetic field
IB most important; for, in the end, most thoughtful people
will make their final judgments turn upon them negatively,
because what is for them immoral, is painful and non-
sesthetic. As we have noted above, however, the majority
of our pleasures have no ethical bearings ; the mass of
aesthetic effects are made" up of elements entirely unmoral.
The attempts to determine the bounds of the aesthetic field
by a process of limitation of the hedonic appear to me to
bring no satisfactory result; nor does it appear that it can
be determined by the characteristic manner of presentation
of the pleasures which make up the total effect. Fechner1
suggested a criterion in the Immediacy of the pleasure-
getting. Von Hartmann on the other hand thinks Fechner's
position is altogether without foundation ; holding that how-
ever immediate the pleasure connected with an object may
be, it does not thus become aesthetic* Such conflict of
opinion makes.this criterion unsatisfactory.
Horwiczs seems to hold that sensational pleasure and
aesthetic pleasure differ not in substance but in that the
aesthetic shows a broadening of the field. Guyau * follows in
the same line, suggesting that the broadening of the agree-
able horizon, the growth in extension of the pleasure field, is
what we experience when an object appears to us to be
aesthetic. This implies, as he distinctly states, that intense
1
 PortcAule d. &., vol. L 15. * Pty. Analyien, voL ii 168.
* JS*. tit Kant, p. 854. ' Problrmt, pp. 70 ffi
2 5
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and unextended pleasures in their very nature are anaesthetic.
This does not accord with my own experience, still I shall
not deny that for him a .widespread thrill alone produced
what he called aesthetic feeling, as may well have been the
case with a man to whom sympathy was so important
an element of life as it was with the writer of L art au
point de vue sociologique. In truth all of our notable
aesthetic psychoses are summational hedonic complexes, but
this fact does not show, as it is made to argue implicitly, that
the pleasurable elements which make up the same are not in
themselves aesthetic. I do not wish to understate the value
of this width of effect in aesthetics, for I think it of very
great importance.
The prominent place which Fechner gives to the Associa-
tional principle shows the importance in which he held it.
All notable works of Art show it, and all persistent types of
Art subject. But, on the other hand, it cannot be held that
this summation per se, this width of field, this extensiveness,
in itself is the all in all in esthetics. To make it so forces
upon us the impossible task of deciding where extension
begins; compels us to look for some degree of extension on
one side of which all is anaesthetic, while on the other all is
aesthetic. Such a line of division, however, cannot be drawn.
(To be continued.)
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